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Convoy GP55 : ウィキペディア英語版
Convoy GP55

Convoy GP55 was a convoy of Allied ships that travelled from Sydney to Brisbane in June 1943 during World War II. It comprised ten cargo ships, three landing ships, tank (LSTs) and an escort of five corvettes. The Japanese submarine ''I-174'' attacked the convoy on 16 June, sinking the United States Army transport ship and damaging USS ''LST-469''. Two of the corvettes subsequently counter-attacked ''I-174'', but only lightly damaged her.
The Australian military conducted an intensive search for ''I-174'' in the days after the attack in the mistaken belief that she had been significantly damaged. This search was not successful and highlighted the unsatisfactory communications between the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). However, another Japanese submarine passing through the area may have been sunk by RAAF aircraft. Because of Japan's deteriorating strategic situation, ''I-174'' was the last Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) submarine to operate off the Australian east coast.
==Background==
(詳細はmidget submarines raided Sydney Harbour on the night of 31 May – 1 June 1942 and attacks on merchant shipping travelling off the east coast began several days later. These attacks continued until August 1942, when the Japanese submarine force was redeployed.〔Stevens (2005), pp. 194–95, 201–03〕 The ''I-174'' made a 24-day patrol off Australia in July and August 1942, but did not attack any ships.〔Stevens (2005), p. 355〕 In response to the Japanese attacks, the Australian naval authorities ordered that all ships with a displacement of more than 1,200 tons and a maximum speed of less than 12 knots travel in escorted convoys from 8 June.〔Stevens (2005), p. 195〕 These convoys were successful in minimising losses, and no escorted ships were sunk off Australia during 1942.〔Stevens (2005), p. 205〕
Japanese submarines resumed operations in Australian waters in January 1943. ''I-21'' made a highly successful patrol in January and February, during which she sank five ships, and two other submarines operated off Sydney and Brisbane in March.〔Stevens (2005), pp. 218–20, 223–24〕 A force of five boats from the IJN's 3rd Submarine Squadron subsequently attacked shipping along the full length of the Australian east coast during April and May in an attempt to disrupt the Allied supply line to New Guinea. This marked the peak of the Japanese submarine offensive against Australia and nine ships were sunk off the east coast within a month.〔Stevens (2005), p. 230–31〕 In contrast with 1942, several successful attacks were made against ships travelling in convoys.〔Gill (1968), pp. 253–62〕
The large number of Japanese attacks in 1943 put great strain on the Allied forces responsible for protecting shipping off eastern Australia. The Australian naval authorities were forced in April to reduce the number of convoys that sailed so their escort could be increased to at least four warships. The RAAF also greatly increased the number of aircraft allocated to escort convoys and ships sailing independently.〔Stevens (2005), pp. 236–37〕 Further ships and aircraft fitted for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) became available in May, but were still not adequate to counter the Japanese attacks.〔Stevens (2005), p. 239〕
The sinking of the hospital ship AHS ''Centaur'' on 14 May 1943 with heavy loss of life led the Advisory War Council to seek information from the RAN and RAAF on the actions being taken to protect shipping. While the RAN acknowledged that the ''Bathurst''-class corvettes that made up most of its escort force were too slow, it argued that the losses suffered by escorted convoys were no worse than those in other parts of the world. Despite the Navy's assurances, Australia's anti-submarine forces were constrained by a shortage of training opportunities and poor coordination between the RAN, RAAF and the United States Navy. The Australian military had also not kept pace with improvements to British and United States ASW doctrine by fully implementing the tactics that had proven most successful in other theatres of the war.〔Stevens (2005), pp. 239–242〕

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